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THE OTHER SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE
JANE S. SCHACTER*
INTRODUCTION
Over the course of his distinguished career, Jeff Sherman has not only
made terrific contributions to the study of sexual orientation and the law,
but also witnessed the creation and the rapid evolution of the field itself.
The chronology is instructive. The Stonewall Riots took place in 1969,
Professor Sherman graduated from Harvard Law School in 1972, and he
began teaching law in 1976. Needless to say, much has happened since
1976, and Sherman's impending retirement gives us an opportunity to look
back and make some observations about what those thirty-plus years have
meant for the legal struggle for sexual orientation equality and for the aca-
demic study of that struggle.
To begin with an unsubtle point: much has changed. Not everything,
by any means, but many things. Compare some significant aspects of to-
day's legal landscape to the legal picture in 1976. The Supreme Court had
not yet weighed in a consequential way on what-if anything-the Consti-
tution meant for gay rights. Neither Lawrence v. Texas nor Romer v. Evans
had yet been decided by the Court in 1976. Indeed, even the movement's
biggest loss in that court-the Bowers v. Hardwick decision upholding
sodomy laws-was 10 years off. Losses in cases involving the St. Patrick's
Day parade, the Boy Scouts of America, and the Solomon Amendment
were also many years down the road.1 No state in the country then had an
anti-discrimination law covering sexual orientation, while 20 states do to-
day.2 Twenty-four states still criminalized consensual sodomy, 3 free of the
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Thanks to Juliet Brodie
for comments and conversation about this subject, and to Erin Schanning and Mark Gaber for excellent
research assistance.
1. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 58 (2006); Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 645 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995).
2. The states are Colo., Conn., D.C., Haw., Ill., Iowa, Me., Md., Mass., Minn., Nev., N.H., N.J.,
N.M., N.Y., Or., R.I., Vt., Wash., Wis. See Human Rights Campaign, Workplace: Laws,
http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplace/workplace-laws.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2009).
3. The states were Ala., Ariz., Ark., D.C., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Kan., Ky., L.A., Md., Mich., Minn.,
Miss., Mo., Mont., Nev., N.C., Okla., R.I., S.C., Tenn., Tex., Utah, and Va. Yao Apasu-Gbotsu et al.,
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constitutional impediment to doing so that Lawrence would later impose.
No state, and only about two dozen municipalities, offered even limited
domestic partnership benefits, 4 and the term "civil union" had not yet been
invented. Today, nine states, the District of Columbia, and some seventy-
eight municipalities offer some form of partnership benefit, ranging from
limited to comprehensive. 5
Perhaps the most striking contrast to today, however, is that same-sex
marriage was on no one's radar in 1976 as a serious possibility. It had been
rejected decisively, with no dissent, by three state appellate courts in the
early 1970s.6 Thirty years later, Massachusetts became the first state to
allow same-sex marriage with its landmark Goodridge decision in 2003.7 In
2008, Connecticut and California courts joined Massachusetts in finding
that same-sex couples had a right to wed protected by the state constitu-
tion,8 although the California ruling was later overturned by a ballot initia-
tive that was challenged in court.9 The Iowa Supreme Court followed in
2009.10And, in what may come to be regarded as the most significant de-
velopment of them all, the Vermont legislature became the first state legis-
lature to legalize same-sex marriage in April 2009.11
Focusing on marriage, in particular, sharpens the contrast with the
state of affairs in 1976 in ways that go beyond the question of legal rights
alone because the marriage struggle today captures much about where the
contemporary movement for sexual orientation equality stands. Since the
campaign for marriage began in earnest in 1993, with a surprising decision
from the Hawaii Supreme Court laying the groundwork for a speedy legali-
zation of same-sex marriage in that state, 12 the quest for the right to marry
Survey on the Law: Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activ-
ity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 524 n.9 (1986).
4. See Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay Relationships, LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND THE LAW
442 nn.l, 7 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993) (stating that "[i]n the last decade [1983-1993, over two
dozen municipalities in the United States and Canada . . . have begun to offer ... domestic partner-
ships.").
5. See Human Rights Campaign, City and County Domestic Partner Registries
http://www.hrc.org/issues/marriage/domestic-partners/9133.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2009).
6. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d
185, 187 (Minn. 1971); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
7. Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
8. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Public Health,
957 A.2d 407,412 (Conn. 2008).
9. Maura Dolan, Prop. 8 Gay Marriage Ban Goes to Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008,
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/20/local/me-prop8-supreme-court20.
10. Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
11. Abby Goodnough, Gay Rights Groups Celebrate Victories in Marriage Push, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2009, at A 1.
12. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993).
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has become the LGBT movement's signature issue. Whether measured by
quantity of major law-reform litigation, column inches in newspapers,
number of ballot measures, or any number of other possible indicia, same-
sex marriage has dominated all other gay-rights issue since 1993, and by a
wide margin. The decade and a half since the initial Hawaii decision has
produced dramatic victories, widespread backlash, and plenty of attention.
Given this high profile, it is not surprising that the same-sex marriage issue
now rivals abortion as a principal focus of the "culture wars," for it has
become a flashpoint for debate not only about sexual orientation, but about
gender and normative visions of family life, as well.
For all the fiery rhetoric and deep disagreements dividing opponents
and proponents of same-sex marriage, however, there are some surprising
points of confluence between the two sides in how they frame the debate.
First, both supporters and opponents of same-sex marriage characterize the
institution of marriage as a centrally important and positive force in com-
munal life.' 3 Such a characterization is, of course, utterly predictable for
those opposing same-sex marriage. For example, the description of mar-
riage as "the foundation of civilization, the seedbed of virtue, and the well-
spring of society" 14 comes from a long-time LGBT rights foe, Focus on the
Family. Rhetoric of this kind is standard fare on the right and could have
been offered up by virtually any proponent of cultural conservatism. Yet it
is hardly obvious that prominent supporters of LGBT rights would also
have such high praise for marriage. Consider, for example, the description
offered by Evan Wolfson, director of Freedom to Marry, former litigator at
Lambda Legal Defense Fund, and a high-profile leader in marriage advo-
cacy. He has said that "gay people, like all human beings, love and want to
declare love, want inclusion in the community and the equal choices that
belong to us as Americans .... Marriage equality is the precondition for
these rights, these protections, this inclusion, this full citizenship."'15 Simi-
larly, conservative gay activist Andrew Sullivan has called marriage the
"highest form of human happiness."'16 And, in Goodridge, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Court deemed marriage a "vital social institution," 1 7 calling
it "one of our community's most rewarding and cherished institutions."' 8
13. This convergence is explored in NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY)
MARRIAGE 98-100 (2008).
14. Family Research Council, Marriage & Family, http://www.frc.org/marriage-family (last
visited Feb. 3, 2009).
15. EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS 18 (2004).
16. ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 156
(1995).
17. Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
18. Id. at 49.
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A second point of confluence is that both sides frame the marriage de-
bate as something of an epochal showdown on LGBT equality. Both, in
other words, seem to see the stakes as high, the outcome as a proxy state-
ment about LGBT equality, and the struggle as a cultural moment of truth.
In his account of the movement for same-sex marriage, historian George
Chauncey neatly captures this sentiment:
[T]he history of marriage has given this debate special significance for
all sides because the freedom to marry, including the right to choose
one's partner in marriage, has come to be regarded as a fundamental civil
right and a powerful symbol of full equality and citizenship. Many fun-
damentalists now strongly oppose the right of gay couples to marry be-
cause they see that right as the ultimate symbol of the equality they
would deny to gay people .... Many lesbians and gay men have em-
braced the campaign for marriage rights because they, too, see marriage
equality as a fundamental sign of their equality and full citizen-
ship .... 19
This improbably-shared framing has lent an aura of inevitability to the
controversy about same-sex marriage-as if the debate reflects the natural
and inescapable culmination of three decades of struggle over LGBT equal-
ity, with access to the most privileged social institution, finally, at stake. In
this essay, I call that notion into question by pressing us to remember an-
other debate about same-sex marriage-one that took place within the
LGBT community, but has, with a few exceptions, largely receded. This
internal debate focused on whether same-sex marriage was a worthy nor-
mative priority for the LGBT movement, and it was inspired by the skepti-
cism of LGBT advocates who believed that other values-feminism, sexual
liberation, cultural difference, to name a few-ought to have trumped the
primacy of marriage advocacy. In some quarters, the views that shaped this
opposition still exist, but the ideas have become something to offer along-
side same-sex marriage rights, not instead of it. For example, a recent book
by Nancy Polikoff, an eloquent, longtime critic of marriage, argues that
LGBT and other progressive advocates ought to pursue both marriage
equality and different forms of legal protections for diversely-configured
households.20
The fact that the public debate about same-sex marriage has been
19. GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE?: THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY'S DEBATE OVER
GAY EQUALITY 165-66 (2004).
20. POLIKOFF, supra note 13. To similar general effect, see Beyond Marriage, Beyond Same-Sex
Marriage: A New Strategic Vision For All Our Families and Relationships, (July 26, 2006),
http://www.beyondmarriage.org/full-statement.html (a coalition of progressive activists and academics
calling for effort to diversify and democratize partnership and household recognition). Polikoff does
favor renaming marriage as "civil partnership." I take up issues relating to forms and names in Part
III.A.I.
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framed as the true test of LGBT equality undoubtedly has been a prime
force in quieting any internal resistance to same-sex marriage. The internal
critics have always had political commitments that place them in deep and
passionate opposition to the "external" critics of same-sex marriage-the
cultural and religious traditionalists who oppose LGBT equality in all its
forms. Indeed, the internal and external resistance to same-sex marriage are
strikingly converse to one another. The internal resistance to marriage ad-
vocacy came from those strongly committed to gay equality, but doubtful
about the institution of marriage. The external resistance comes from those
strongly opposed to gay equality, but reverent about the traditional institu-
tion of marriage.
Although the internal resistance has substantially faded from view, I
propose that we revisit it in light of the dramatic developments of the last
fifteen years. I do so with three purposes in mind. The first is simply to
remember that there was once a robust internal debate about seeking same-
sex marriage-a fact, I have learned, that is unknown to many LGBT sup-
porters today. Throughout the seventeen years that I have taught Sexual
Orientation and the Law, I have noticed that students have become increas-
ingly less familiar with the idea that there could be any critique of mar-
riage, and more of them have become dismissive of the idea that there
might be legitimate grounds for seeing the marriage issue as anything other
than the symbolic equality question that it has come to be in the contempo-
rary political arena. There is, thus, intellectual and historical value in re-
membering the critique. Second, it is worth reflecting on how the public
debate about same-sex marriage might have unfolded differently had the
marriage skeptics within the LGBT community prevailed and persuaded
the movement to pursue a different path. To this end, I consider, in counter-
factual fashion, paths in the road that were not taken by LGBT advocates. I
sketch out some alternate directions that might have been pursued at vari-
ous points in the struggle, had the internal critique commanded more sup-
port. Third, I consider what the contemporary relevance of the internal
critique might be. Here, I suggest that there is a rich set of empirical re-
search questions that have gone largely unexplored by scholars. That we
have had several years of experience with same-sex marriage, civil union,
and/or domestic partnership in some American states (as well as foreign
countries) supplies a factual context that can facilitate new scrutiny and
exploration of some of the arguments advanced by marriage skeptics. This
scrutiny, in turn, can produce useful insights to guide future advocacy and
policy.
In Part I, I offer a brief capsule history of the contemporary movement
2009]
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for marriage equality, sufficient to provide a context for later discussion. In
Part II, I identify the major conceptual strands of internal resistance to
same-sex marriage. I use as my focal point an influential 1989 debate be-
tween Tom Stoddard and Paula Ettelbrick, both leading advocates of same-
sex equality. Their debate proved quite prescient in laying out the norma-
tive bases for a pro-LGBT critique of marriage advocacy. In Part III, I look
both to the past and future in considering that critique. Looking backward, I
consider paths that the movement might have taken had the internal resis-
tance proven more powerful, and the normative priorities and strategic
judgments of the LGBT movement been different. Looking forward, I sug-
gest a series of questions that merit empirical study in light of what has
developed in the last several years.
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AS PUBLIC CONTROVERSY
In this section, I provide a capsule overview of the movement for mar-
riage equality. More comprehensive treatments are available elsewhere; 21
for our purposes, this thumbnail sketch of the key legal and political chro-
nology should suffice. Although the contemporary movement for marriage
rights began in earnest in 1993 with the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision
in Baehr, it is worth noting that, even before Stonewall, the then-fledgling,
gay-oriented Metropolitan Community Church was performing marriage
ceremonies for committed couples at the time of its founding in 1968.22
And, some early gay activists sought marriage rights in the 1970s, seeing
their claim as a "political act with political implications. '23 Three lawsuits
seeking access to same-sex marriage were filed in the early 1970s, but re-
jected decisively by state appellate courts. 24
Contemporary developments began in 1993. Interestingly, the major
gay-rights litigation groups that have shaped the movement's law-reform
agenda and the legal campaign for same-sex marriage were not the ones to
launch this modem movement. The issue first shot to prominence with a
case that was brought by private counsel because the advocacy groups had
declined to litigate it.25 That generative lawsuit led to the Hawaii Supreme
21. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER
OR WORSE? 11-31 (2006); Jane S. Schacter, Courts and the Politics of Backlash: Marriage Equality,
Then and Now 15-26; 36-51 (forthcoming, 82 S. CAL. L. REV (2009)) (on file with author).
22. CHAUNCEY, supra note 19, at 91-92.
23. Id. at 90 (quoting Minnesota litigants Baker and McConnell).
24. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
25. See JASON PIERCESON, COURTS, LIBERALISM AND RIGHTS: GAY LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA 107 (2005); David L. Chambers, Couples: Marriage, Civil Union, and
Domestic Partnership, in CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY AND CIVIL RIGHTS 293
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Court's landmark decision in Baehr v. Lewin, calling for the state's tradi-
tional marriage law to be subject to strict scrutiny under Hawaii's equal
rights amendment. 26 The explosive ruling was widely regarded to signal the
impending legalization of same-sex marriage, and it galvanized both sup-
porters and opponents around the country almost as soon as it was issued.
In the decade and a half since Baehr, there have been dramatic devel-
opments both for and against same-sex marriage. The Baehr decision itself,
portending the legalization of same-sex marriage in that state, never came
to fruition because of a 1998 state constitutional amendment banning same-
sex marriage unless approved by the state legislature. 27 But the decision
started a ball rolling that has led to substantial law reforms. Since Baehr,
the national gay-rights bar has pursued a strategy of litigating marriage
under state constitutions, and choosing states regarded as plausible sites for
a victory. In four states-Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, and
Iowa-the state supreme court has ruled that the state constitution protects
the right of same-sex couples to wed.28 The California decision was over-
turned by a ballot measure in 2008, but that measure was challenged in
litigation that is pending as this article goes to press. 29 Supreme courts in
two other states-Vermont and New Jersey-have ruled that the state con-
stitution requires that same-sex couples be accorded rights and responsibili-
ties equal to marriage, 30 but those decisions permitted the state legislature
to respond to the ruling by enacting comprehensive civil unions in lieu of
opening marriage per se, and that is what the legislatures chose to do.31
Legislatures in seven other states have passed some form of domestic part-
nership or civil union legislation since Baehr.32 In 2009, Vermont broke
significant new ground when it became the first state to allow same-sex
marriage as a matter of legislative policy, and other states followed by con-
sidering legislative legalization, as well.33
While there has been considerable progress in securing rights for
same-sex couples, there has also been a series of litigation losses and many
(John D'Emilio, William Turner & Urvashi Vaid eds,, 2000).
26. 852 P.2d 44, 63, 68 (Haw. 1993).
27. See PIERCESON, supra note 25, at 124-25.
28. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Public Health,
957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008); Goodridge v. Dep't of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948-49 (Mass.
2003); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
29. See Dolan, supra note 9.
30. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 220-21 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
31. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28 (West Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (West 2007).
32. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CARLOS A. BALL & JANE S. SCHACTER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW ch. 6 (3d ed. 2008).
33. Abby Goodnough, Maine Senate Backs Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2009, at
2009]
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political defeats. State high courts in Maryland, New York, and Washing-
ton have rejected claims of a right to marry asserted by same-sex couples, 34
as have appellate courts in Arizona and Indiana. 35 The political losses,
however, have been more substantial. Indeed, almost as soon as Baehr was
decided, opponents of same-sex marriage mobilized on the state and na-
tional levels. In addition to securing the constitutional amendment in Ha-
waii that blunted the effect of Baehr itself, opponents mobilized nationally
and won passage of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in
1996.36 DOMA, signed by Bill Clinton before the 1996 election, codifies a
definition of marriage as between one man and one woman for purposes of
federal programs, and also provides that states are not required to recognize
same-sex marriages performed elsewhere. In addition, between 1996 and
2008, opponents of marriage equality successfully pressed for the enact-
ment of "mini-DOMAs" in over forty states. 37 Some of the mini-DOMAs
are statutory and others are constitutional: some target marriage alone, and
others limit the recognition of same-sex relationships more broadly. Almost
every ballot measure that has put a mini-DOMA of some kind before the
voters has passed,38 though the victory margins have varied. Proposition 8,
enacted in California to amend the state constitution and wipe out a state
supreme court decision finding a constitutional right to wed, passed with
only 52% of the vote, down from the 61% of voters who supported a statu-
tory mini-DOMA in California in 2000. 39 The political and legal develop-
ments since Baehr have, thus, reflected both dramatic progress and
substantial retrenchment for same-sex couples. Notably, over the same time
period, public opinion supporting same-sex marriage and civil unions has
risen markedly.40
34. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 586 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 12
(N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 990 (Wash. 2006).
35. Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 465 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Morrison v. Sadler, 821
N.E.2d 15, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
37. Nat'l Gay and Lesbian Taskforce, Anti-Gay Measures in the U.S.,
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue..maps/GayMarriage_ I_04_08_CAAZFL.pdf
(last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
38. The exception is a 2006 ballot measure in Arizona. Sonya Geis, New Tactic in Fighting Mar-
riage Initiatives: Opponents Cite Effects on Straight Couples, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2006, at A03.
39. Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Ban in 3 States in Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
2008, at Al.
40. See, e.g., Jennifer Agiesta and Alec MacGillis, Poll: Rising U.S. Support for Social Issues,
Such as Gay Marriage, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 30, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/04/30/AR2009043001640.html.
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II. REMEMBERING THE OPPOSITION FROM WITHIN
The rise of marriage to the top of the LGBT agenda was not inevita-
ble. For one thing, as described earlier, it is striking that a law-reform liti-
gation campaign of this magnitude was started without the blessing or
participation of the major gay-rights groups, whose lawyers thought it was
premature to press the marriage issue. Nevertheless, once the proverbial
genie was out of the bottle, the groups came aboard and have played an
active role in molding the marriage movement ever since.
More significantly, the primacy of the marriage issue to the contempo-
rary gay-rights movement was not inevitable because of the political resis-
tance it once faced within the LGBT movement from pro-equality marriage
skeptics. The basic ideas that formed the core of the internal skepticism
were articulated at an early point in an influential and high-profile debate
within the gay community about whether to pursue access to marriage. The
debate between the late Tom Stoddard, then the executive director of
Lambda Legal Defense Fund, and Paula Ettelbrick, then Lambda's legal
director, was published in Out/Look Magazine in 1989. 41 It has been widely
republished since then in sexual orientation and the law casebooks and
other venues.42
At an early point in the exchange, Stoddard and Ettelbrick mapped out
the rough parameters of the internal debate, with Stoddard arguing for, and
Ettelbrick against, the normative priority of marriage. To a striking degree,
the exchange presaged the arguments that would follow. Although Ettel-
brick would later refine and elaborate some of her arguments, 43 her essay
identified in at least rudimentary form the key themes that would later sur-
face among pro-equality marriage skeptics.
Stoddard favored the pursuit of same-sex marriage, invoking practical,
political, and philosophical concerns in his argument. First, Stoddard ar-
gued that marriage would bring many practical, tangible benefits, and he
41. Gay Marriage: A Must or a Bust?, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at 9, 9-17, reprinted in CASES AND
MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 32, at 678-88.
42. For examples of law school casebooks, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN HUNTER,
SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW 1098-1101 (2d ed. 2004); RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at
678-88. For examples of other academic works, see FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES: KINSHIP AND
DOMESTIC POLICIES, chs. 35-36 (Karen V. Hansen & Anita Ilta Garey eds., 1998): THE COLUMBIA
READER ON LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN MEDIA, SCIENCE AND POLITICS 633-39 (Larry P. Gross &
James D. Woods eds., 1999).
43. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Domestic Partnerships, Civil Unions or Marriage: One Size Does Not Fit
All, 64 ALB. L. REV. 905, 905-14 (2001); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Wedlock Alert: A comment on Lesbian
and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 107, 107-66 (1996); cf Paula L. Ettelbrick & Julie
Shapiro, Are We on the Path to Liberation Now?: Same-Sex Marriage at Home and Abroad, 2 SEATTLE
J. SOC. JUST. 475-92 (2004) (transcript of dialogue between two authors).
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identified the wide array of rights and entitlements that flow, by law or
custom, from marriage.44 He also argued that contractual arrangements
could not adequately replace access to marriage because of doctrinal and
financial barriers. His emphasis on the wide sweep of benefits denied to
same-sex couples by virtue of withholding marriage rights has become a
staple of LGBT marriage advocacy. 45
Second, Stoddard argued that marriage was the most important politi-
cal issue for LGBT advocates because it is the one "that most fully tests the
dedication of people who are not gay to full equality for gay people, and
also the issue most likely to lead ultimately to a world free from discrimi-
nation against lesbians and gay men."'46 Foreshadowing some of the pro-
marriage rhetoric that would shape the arguments of the movement many
years later-as well as the emergence of marriage as the proxy question for
LGBT equality-Stoddard called marriage "the centerpiece of our entire
social structure," something that "inspires sentiments suggesting that is
something almost suprahuman. ' '47 His claim that marriage was sui generis
led him to reject, categorically, the idea that domestic partnership or any
other new institution ought to be pursued.48 He believed that such institu-
tions could "never assure full equality," and that "[g]ay relationships will
continue to be accorded a subsidiary status until the day that gay couples
have exactly the same rights as their heterosexual counterparts. '49 Once
again, Stoddard neatly presaged later arguments by LGBT forces that do-
mestic partnership, or other new legal structures, could offer only "separate
but equal" status to same-sex couples. 50
Finally, Stoddard added a "philosophical" element, claiming that mar-
44. Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at
9, 9-13 reprinted in CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 32,
at 679-81.
45. See, e.g., WOLFSON, supra note 15, at 4 (characterizing marriage as "the legal gateway to a
vast array of protections, responsibilities, and benefits, most of which cannot be replicated in any other
way, no matter how much forethought you show or how much you are able to spend on attorneys' fees
and assembling proxies and papers").
46. Stoddard, supra note 44, at 681.
47. Id. at681-82.
48. Id. at 682.
49. Id.
50. See e.g., WOLFSON, supra note 15, at 144 ("Why should we have two lines at the clerk's
office, two sets of rules and unequal solutions? Why should we say to some kids and couples, 'your
families have to come through the back door?"'). The California Supreme Court echoed this theme in
its marriage decision:
[R]etaining the designation of marriage exclusively for opposite-sex couples and providing
only a separate and distinct designation for same-sex couples may well have the effect of per-
petuating a more general premise-now emphatically rejected by this state-that gay indi-
viduals and same-sex couples are in some respects 'second class citizens'.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 384-85 (Cal. 2008).
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riage should be a choice, not an obligation. He confessed that he might
choose not to marry his long-term partner, but argued that same-sex cou-
ples ought to be able to make this determination for themselves. 5' In addi-
tion to distinguishing between choice and obligation, Stoddard went on to
argue that allowing same-sex couples to marry could transform the institu-
tion of marriage by eliminating the "gender requirements of marriage" and
thereby "divest[] [the institution] of the sexist trappings of the past. ' 52 On
this issue, Stoddard returned to the point with which he began his essay:
acknowledging that marriage had been "oppressive, especially (although
not entirely) to women. ' 53 Thus, he ultimately staked his claim not on the
intrinsic worth of marriage as historically or currently structured, but on the
capacity of same-sex couples to change the institution. This point has not
been part of the public rhetoric of the contemporary movement for same-
sex marriage, but it has been developed by LGBT scholars. Nan Hunter, for
example, has argued that same-sex marriage has the capacity to dramati-
cally alter the gender dynamics that shape marriage. 54
Ettelbrick's opposition is succinctly captured in the title of her piece,
Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?55 She challenged the idea
that marriage could be liberating in the senses that matter most.56 She drew,
in part, on feminist and progressive critiques of family law that had un-
folded in the twenty years or so before she wrote. Her analysis can be dis-
tilled into three main conceptual claims, each of which later found its place,
and was further developed, in the literature of pro-equality marriage skepti-
cism. We can call these claims "anti-assimilationist," "anti-universalist,"
and "functionalist."
First, Ettelbrick argued that marriage represented uncritical assimila-
tion to dominant norms. Such assimilation, she suggested, would thwart the
development of a gay culture that would "push[] the parameters of sex,
sexuality, and family." 57 Along these lines, she feared that same-sex mar-
riage would lead gays and lesbians to "mimic[] all that is bad
about... marriage in [their] effort to appear to be the same as straight cou-
51. Stoddard, supra note 44, at 682.
52. Id. at 683.
53. Id. at 679.
54. Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9, 16-
19 (1991).
55. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path To Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Fall 1989, at
9, 14-17, reprinted in CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW, supra note 32,
at 683.




pies. '58 And, she argued that marriage advocacy would take the LGBT
movement on an ironic path to a different kind of inequality, by stigmatiz-
ing "all gay and lesbian sex that is not performed in the marital context."59
In contesting the assimilationism of marriage advocacy, Ettelbrick put for-
ward a vision of what feminist theorists would later call "difference equal-
ity," rather than the "sameness equality" favored by Stoddard. Where
Stoddard had argued that equality meant securing for lesbians and gay men
"exactly the same rights as their heterosexual counterparts," 60 Ettelbrick
asserted that "[j]ustice for gay men and lesbians will be achieved only
when we are accepted and supported in this society despite our differences
from the dominant culture and the choices we make regarding our relation-
ships." 61
This idea of marriage as rank assimilationism became a prominent
theme in the literature that followed, and was engaged by writers like Mi-
chael Warner, Ruthann Robson, and Katherine Franke.62 Warner's book,
The Trouble with Normal, is a particularly influential contribution, focusing
not only on the argument that same-sex marriage repudiates the possibility
of a distinctively queer culture, but also on the idea that extending marriage
to same-sex couples would undermine the cause of sexual liberation by
creating a new class of sexual outlaws comprised of those engaged in non-
marital--or what Franke calls "non-normative"-sex. 63 Other theorists
have pursued this point as well.64 As in Ettelbrick's essay, this argument is
built on the fundamental idea of equality as difference, not sameness.
Ettelbrick's second principal critique of marriage proceeded from an
anti-universalist stance. She asserted that marriage advocacy did not pay
sufficient attention to the gender, race, and class dimensions of marriage.
65
The essay did not unpack these critiques in detail, but identified the basic
points. Ettelbrick noted, for example, that marriage has a patriarchal history
58. Id. at 685.
59. Id.
60. Stoddard, supra note 44, at 682.
61. Ettelbrick, supra note 55, at 684.
62. MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER
LIFE (1999); Katherine M. Franke, Commentary, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004); Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate
Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 511, 540 (1990).
63. WARNER, supra note 62, at 111-16; Franke, supra note 62, at 1415.
64. Sheila Rose Foster, The Symbolism of Rights and the Costs of Symbolism: Some Thoughts on
the Campaign for Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 319, 327-28 (1998); Angela P.
Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs?: Toward a Political Economy of Sexuality, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1539, 1569 (2006); Kara S. Suffredini & Madeleine V. Findley, Speak Now: Progressive
Considerations on the Advent of Civil Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, 45 B.C. L. REv. 595, 607
(2004).
65. Ettelbrick, supra note 55, at 686.
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and that "[g]ay liberation is inexorably linked to women's liberation. Each
is essential to the other. '66 She also argued that same-sex marriage advo-
cacy would advance the interests of the most privileged, while leaving un-
addressed the urgent needs of "more marginal members of the lesbian and
gay community (women, people of color, working class, and poor). ' 67 The
gender, race, and class critique of marriage was elaborated and developed
by later writers critical of marriage advocacy. For example, in an early
piece, Nitya Duclos argued that "legal marriage is going to help some and
hurt some roughly according to existing rank of social power. '68 This gen-
eral line of argument was also pursued by others. 69 On the issue of gender,
many pro-equality marriage skeptics went on to argue that marriage re-
mains an institution that disadvantages women and ought to be challenged
on that basis.70 On the issues of race and class, Darren Hutchinson has been
a principal critic of the failure of same-sex marriage advocacy to grapple
with race and class differences in the LGBT community. For example, he
has pointed out the lower rates at which gay persons of color marry, as well
as the harm done to families headed by single mothers by pro-same-sex
marriage rhetoric celebrating the unique virtue of two-parent families. 71
A third idea articulated by Ettelbrick was functional. Arguing that
pushing for marriage rights ignores the need to challenge the unjust social
and legal privileging of marriage itself, she called for functionally-oriented
efforts to "break the tradition of piling benefits and privileges on to those
who are married, while ignoring the real life needs of those who are not. '72
Marriage advocacy, Ettelbrick suggested, would perniciously blunt the
demand for more fundamental social change by accepting the idea that
important benefits like access to health care are appropriately linked to
marriage. 73
This functional idea, too, was developed in subsequent literature, most
66. Id. at 684.
67. Id. at 686.
68. Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Marriage, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 31,
59(1991).
69. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 64, at 325; Harris, supra note 64, at 1569-70; Suffedini &
Findley, supra note 64, at 607.
70. See, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 13, at 12, 98; Robson & Valentine, supra note 64, at 536-37;
cf Julie Shapiro, Reflections on Complicity, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 657, 658, 660-61 (2005) (arguments
by a contemporary advocate of same-sex marriage sympathetic to the feminist critique).
71. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites"?: Race, Sexual Identity, and
Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1370-71 (2000); Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29
CONN. L. REv. 561, 589-90 (1997).




prominently in a series of articles and a recent book by Nancy Polikoff.
Polikoff has long been a leading pro-equality marriage skeptic, and she is
one of the few who continues to actively press parts of that case today. Her
2008 book, Beyond (Straight and Gay) Marriage: Valuing All Families
Under the Law, marshals data and case studies to show the policy perver-
sity of protecting marriage only. 74 Polikoff illustrates the range of relation-
ships that are left vulnerable under a regime that selectively protects
marriage alone, and proposes a more functionally-responsive vision of
family law to address the needs of diverse families. 75 A few years before
Polikoff's book, a coalition of progressive political activists had published
a statement expressing support for an approach of this kind. In Beyond
Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic Vision For All Our Families and
Relationships, the coalition called for efforts to "diversify and democratize
partnership and household recognition," and to seek "government support
of all of our households. '76
The 2006 statement and the 2008 publication of Polikoff's book are
probably the most salient attempt to revive at least parts of the internal
debate. Significantly, however, neither calls for the rejection of same-sex
marriage. They emphasize, instead, that advocacy for marriage equality
should be paired with a more inclusive policy that acknowledges and ad-
dresses the needs of a range of differently-configured family forms. 77
Shaped in part by the harsh anti-gay backlash, these efforts reflect not so
much a critique of marriage per se as a critique of the marriage-only view-
point, and the hierarchy that such exclusivity entails. Even with this quali-
fied embrace of marriage, however, these efforts are swimming against a
powerful political tide in seeking to re-conceptualize the marriage debate.
As part of her functional argument, Ettelbrick argued for the aggres-
sive pursuit of domestic partnership rights. 78 In her view, an appropriately
inclusive vision of domestic partnership ought "not [be] limited to sexual or
romantic relationships" but, instead, should "provide[] an important oppor-
74, POLIKOFF, supra note 13. For other arguments pursuing this theme, see Ruth Colker, Mar-
riage, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 321, 324-325 (1991); Duclos, supra note 68, at 33-34; Zachary A.
Kramer, Exclusionary Equality and the Case for Same-Sex Families: A Reworking of Martha Fine-
man's Re-visioned Family Law, 2 SEATTLE J.SOC. JUST. 505, 509-12, 524 (2004).
75. Polikoff draws on the work of Martha Fineman in placing concepts of care and dependency at
the center of family law. See Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read Martha
Fineman, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 167, 173, 176 (2000). On the potential applicability of
Fineman to the same sex marriage issue, see Kramer, supra note 74, at 506-07.
76. Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic Vision for All Our Families and Relationships,
http://www.beyondmarriage.org/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
77. Polikoff also called for marriage to be renamed "civil partnership." Polikoff, supra note 20. at
132-33. On naming issues, see infra Part lI.A. I.
78. Ettelbrick, supra note 55, at 687.
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tunity for those who are not related by blood or marriage to claim certain
minimal protections. '79 She implored her fellow advocates to "keep our
eyes on the goals of providing true alternatives to marriage and of radically
reordering society's views of family." 80 In a sense, this argument bridges
the functionalist and anti-assimilationist aspects of her argument. It calls
for functional family structures that meet the relevant range of human
needs. But it also explicitly calls for the embrace of new and different insti-
tutions, not the mere revision of old ones.
The idea that meaningful equality means shaping new institutions, as
opposed to gaining entrance to marriage, took different forms in the litera-
ture that developed in the wake of the Stoddard-Ettelbrick debate. Not all
approaches have embraced the functional idea that a broad range of rela-
tionships, romantic and otherwise, need protection. For example, some
have embraced simply the affirmative benefit of the civil union as a mar-
riage substitute, and celebrate the fact that it is "tabula rasa-the les-
bian/gay community can imbue it with a meaning unique to [its] own
culture and tradition." 81 Others-like Polikoff-have argued more expan-
sively for the virtues of pluralism, urging a spectrum of options that can be
tailored to particular needs and circumstances. 82 Notwithstanding these
differences, however, arguments of this kind all resist what has become an
article of faith in the movement for same-sex marriage: the singular cache
and equalizing capacity of marriage.
III. IMPLICATIONS: LOOKING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD
The internal resistance summarized in the previous section has largely
receded. To the extent that aspects of it survive, they do so largely at the
margins of the noisy public debate between proponents and opponents of
same-sex marriage. In this section, I first look back and consider the points
at which-and ways in which-the LGBT rights movement might have
made different strategic and substantive choices, had the internal critiques
exercised greater influence. I then look forward, explaining some contem-
porary implications of these critiques and suggesting scholarly directions
79. Id.
80. ld. at 688.
81. Greg Johnson, Civil Union: A Reappraisal, 30 VT. L. R-Ev. 891, 906 (2006) (arguing for civil
unions either as an alternative that some may affirmatively prefer or as a remedy for legal inequality
while same-sex marriage is being sought); cf Nancy K. Kubasek, Kara Jennings & Shannon T. Browne,
Fashioning a Tolerable Domestic Partners Statute in an Environment Hostile to Same Sex Marriages, 7
LAW & SEXUALITY 55, 78-79, 85 (1997) (arguing on pragmatic grounds).
82. Suffredini & Findley, supra note 64, at 616-17; Lisa Duggan, Holy Matrimony!, THE NATION,
Mar. 15, 2004, at 14, 15-16.
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for the future.
A. Looking Backward
It is not all that difficult to identify a principal reason that the internal
debate has largely faded. Immediately after the 1993 Baehr decision, same-
sex marriage was targeted fiercely by anti-gay forces and cast as a show-
down issue. Once framed as such, and with backlash measures proliferating
around the country at a dizzying speed, the option to continue critiquing
marriage became distinctly unpalatable to pro-equality marriage skeptics
within the LGBT movement. In a piece reflecting on her transition from
marriage skeptic to attorney litigating a same-sex marriage case in Wash-
ington State, Julie Shapiro observes that "feminist anti-assimilationists"
like herself became boxed in once marriage became "the primary battle-
ground between pro-lesbian and gay and anti-lesbian and gay forces" be-
cause "[t]o align oneself with the vitriolic forces of anti-lesbian
fundamentalism is unthinkable. '83
In light of the widespread anti-gay backlash that has unfolded in the
wake of the Hawaii litigation, is it possible to imagine a different response?
Were there other viable tactical choices for the LGBT movement in the
aftermath of the Baehr decision, given the fervent opposition demonstrated
by anti-gay marriage groups? We cannot fully know how viable such
strategies might have been because of the way events have unfolded. The
fact is, marriage was prioritized, the concerns articulated by the internal
critics did not carry the day, and the marriage debate took center stage as a
referendum on LGBT equality. It bears emphasis, moreover, that LGBT
advocates hardly forced marriage on an unwilling constituency. If anything,
some measure of the opposite seems to be true. Given the initial reluctance
of the major organizations to pursue marriage, it is not unreasonable to
conclude that marriage was vigorously sought by segments of the LGBT
grassroots.
I would like to sketch out, however, some political paths not taken,
and suggest that the LGBT movement had options that would have allowed
it to respond differently, while still remaining fiercely dedicated to LGBT
equality. As a thought experiment, let us consider two kinds of political
options that might have pushed the debate in different directions at key
points: positively embracing one or more new institutions to protect same-
83. Shapiro, supra note 70, at 657-58, 665. Responding to similar political dynamics, Nancy
Polikoff in her book makes the point that her critique of protecting marriage only should not obscure the
fact that "[w]hen Evan Wolfson debates [same sex marriage opponent] David Blankenhom, there is no
question about which side I support." POLIKOFF, supra note 13, at 209.
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sex couples; or calling for the elimination of secular marriage altogether.
1. The Positive Embrace of Difference
One imaginable path for the LGBT movement would have been to
seek, deliberately, new institutional structures for protecting those in same-
sex relationships (and, perhaps, those in other relationships in need of legal
protection, as well). In other words, the political strategy for protecting
same-sex couples might have been to pursue and embrace difference as a
positive and chosen value, rather than to characterize alternative structures
as an insulting second-best that codified LGBT exclusion. This effort
would have provided a way to demand justice for same-sex couples, while
avoiding the assimilationist aspects of marriage. At various points in the
debate, in other words, the LGBT movement might have chosen to seek
out, embrace, own, and try to shape one or more new legal institutions.
First, before Baehr was ever decided, a few dozen municipalities had
domestic partnership ordinances. Recall that these were alluded to by both
Stoddard and Ettelbrick in their debate. Thus, at an early point, LGBT po-
litical forces might have chosen to set their sights on some version of do-
mestic partnership, expand it to the state and/or federal level, and put its
energies into deciding who should be protected (same-sex couples only or
opposite sex couples as well? Romantically-attached couples only or other
relationships in need of legal protection?). This course might have been
charted before or after Baehr.
A second opportunity arose a few years after Baehr, in 1998. When
Hawaii amended its constitution to ban same-sex marriage without legisla-
tive approval, it codified "reciprocal beneficiaries," a legal status available
to any two unmarried adults, whether in a committed romantic relationship
or not.84 The reciprocal beneficiaries law created a conspicuous opportu-
nity to pursue not only the anti-assimilationist strand of the internal cri-
tique, but the anti-universalist and functionalist aspects, as well. The new
Hawaii legal mechanism created the opportunity for progressive, coalition-
oriented politics because it afforded legal protection not only to committed
same-sex couples, but also to other pairs of adults who are legally barred
from marrying, such as a widow and her adult son, two elderly siblings, or
two other adults living in a kinship structure of some sort. The enactment
of this law might, thus, have marked a moment to rally around a new legal
status to be inscribed with the sort of broad, egalitarian values articulated
by Ettelbrick, Polikoff, and others. That did not happen, however; instead,
84. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4 (West 2008).
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the statute largely faded from view and is more likely seen (if seen at all) as
a half-measure enacted to mollify the disappointed supporters of same-sex
marriage than as the beginning of a bold new policy path.
Finally, after the Vermont Supreme Court decided Baker in 1999, and
the civil union was born as a legislatively-designed, comprehensive mar-
riage substitute in 2000, same-sex couples had another opportunity to seize
the mantle of change and make it the community's own. The creation of
civil unions, in fact, was greeted with great joy by LGBT citizens around
the country and with equally intense alarm by anti-gay forces.85 A civil
union is more of a marriage substitute than the reciprocal beneficiaries law,
so it is less responsive to the functional issues. Still, one can imagine an
energetic, national political campaign for civil unions, and a strategy that
celebrated their distinctiveness, rather than decried their intrinsic inequal-
ity.86
Gay-rights advocates have generally rejected the course of civil un-
ions, based on the idea that difference means disadvantage. On this view,
the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage necessarily imposes a
mark of stigma. This objection has strong force if one focuses principally
on the extant cultural meaning of marriage, and the familiarity and recogni-
tion it enjoys. It is forceful, as well, if one adopts the idea that marriage is
normatively central to social life. And it is forceful if access to marriage is
specifically and uniquely sought by LGBT advocates, and then expressly
denied-as it has been in many states in the country. Once all those pieces
fall into place, the claim of "separate but equal" lodged by gay-rights advo-
cates against marriage substitutes becomes quite powerful. But there is a
path dependency to the foothold this framing ultimately gained. Had other
values trumped the commitment to marriage per se-values like cultural
distinctiveness and/or a robust commitment to new, egalitarian social insti-
tutions-the script might have been written differently. Once marriage and
marriage alone was identified as the sole outcome consistent with constitu-
tional equality, however, the rest of the political narrative was firmly estab-
lished.
Thinking in terms of path dependency poses a hard question: can we
really imagine navigating around the "separate but equal" problem as a
matter of political advocacy? The deeper question is whether social groups,
especially historically subordinated ones, can shape the social meaning of
85. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNION AND THE
FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 43-82 (2002); cf Johnson, supra note 81, at 892.
86. See Johnson, supra note 81, at 908.
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their own choices and struggles. 87 A skeptic about the ability of social
groups to do so might argue that casting the issue of marriage-alternatives
in terms of the strategic and rhetorical choices made by the LGBT move-
ment is simply a noxious modem-day equivalent of the majority opinion's
flippant claim in Plessy v. Ferguson.88 Plessy infamously characterized the
idea that "enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with
a badge of inferiority" as true "solely because the colored race chooses to
put that construction upon it."89 It is possible, in other words, that no matter
how enthusiastically LGBT advocates embraced the chance to define their
own institution, the social meaning of an alternative legal status would
never be understood as anything more than second-class. On the other
hand, it is plausible that the received understanding of alternatives to mar-
riage might have evolved differently had the LGBT movement itself es-
chewed praise of marriage, and instead unapologetically sought out a new
institution, not as marriage manqu6, but as a way to create a new social
form that recognizes the distinctive cultural experience of same-sex cou-
ples. In the end, the question eludes a sure answer. It inevitably calls for
speculative judgments and has the characteristic difficulties of counterfac-
tual inquiry. What is most significant, perhaps, is that the possible virtues
of embracing, rather than condemning, difference were not seriously con-
sidered.
A related, yet conceptually distinct, tactic that the LGBT community
might have pursued would have been to appropriate for itself the preroga-
tive of naming civil unions "marriages" as an informal matter.90 That is, the
legal name need not necessarily have overlapped with the social practice of
naming civil unions or domestic partnerships. After all, long before any
state allowed same-sex marriage, same-sex couples had (and exercised) the
option to hold what they called weddings, wear wedding bands, refer to
partners as "husbands," "wives," or "spouses," and call themselves mar-
ried. Declining to cede naming rights to the state might have been another
potential tactic for trying to contest and shape social meaning. Such a prac-
tice, however, would have been far more instrumental and limited in its
aspirations, and far less ideologically coherent, than the choice described
87. On the role of social movements in trying to shape new social meanings and constitutional
understandings, see generally Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory,
90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1558-63 (2004).
88. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
89. Id. at 551.
90. The New Jersey Supreme Court alluded to this idea when it said that, "[h]owever the Legisla-
ture may act, same-sex couples will be free to call their relationships by the name they choose..." Lewis
v. Harris, 908 A. 2d 196, 223 (N.J. 2006).
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above to seek and affirmatively celebrate one or more separate institutions.
The inevitable effect of a rhetorical strategy designed to blur the line be-
tween marriage and civil unions would, after all, have been to reinforce the
centrality of marriage itself.
2. Calling for the Elimination of Marriage
A different possibility would have been to establish as a central aim
the elimination of secular marriage altogether, leaving marriage rules to be
adopted and enforced only by religious institutions, and a single, new civil
status to be accorded all committed relationships. Unlike the positive em-
brace of difference described above, this approach would have satisfied the
demands of a sameness-based approach to equality, yet not involved the
gay-rights movement in marriage advocacy. This approach could have been
taken at an early point, or advanced later, as a response to the calls for ex-
clusion of same-sex couples that have driven the backlash.
The virtues of an approach like this have been argued by a diverse set
of commentators. Many have made a libertarian or liberal case, focused on
the ability of contracts to structure the relationship between couples as they
see fit, the virtues of state even-handedness as between gay and straight
couples, and the desirable autonomy of religions to set their own rules
about who may marry.91 Some proposals of this kind reject the stark priva-
tization of marriage through contract and argue for recognition of gender-
neutral civil unions instead.92 A different proposal for abolishing marriage
has been made by feminist scholar Martha Fineman, who rejects the prem-
ises of libertarianism and argues that the state should subsidize and provide
benefits to caretaker-dependent relationships, rather than to married cou-
ples.93 If the main purpose of marriage is to provide for children, Fineman
argues, that ought to be done explicitly and by design, rather than through
the indirect vehicle of marriage.94 Some sexual orientation scholars have
argued the virtues of Fineman's general approach, while offering modifica-
91. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, A "Judeo-Christian" Argument for Privatizing Marriage, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 1221 (2006); Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case
for Abolishing Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161 (2006); David Boaz, Privatize Marriage,
SLATE, Apr. 25, 1997, http://slate.com/id/2440/; Michael Kinsley, Abolish Marriage, SLATE, July 2,
2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2085127/.
92. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, To Fix Gay Dilemma, Government Should Quit the Marriage
Business, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, at B15; Mary Lyndon Shanley & Linda McClain, Should States
Abolish Marriage?, LEGAL AFFAIRS, May, 16, 2005, http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/ debate-
club-m0505.msp.
93. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Meaning of Marriage, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS 29, 30
(Anita Bernstein ed., 2006). Along similar lines, see Dorian Solot & Marshall Miller, Taking Govern-
ment Out of the Marriage Business: Families Would Benefit, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS, supra at 70, 75.
94. Fineman, supra note 93, at 40.
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tions to more consciously and directly address the needs of same-sex cou-
ples.95
Whatever the theoretical virtues of the abolish-marriage approach, it
has presumably been viewed as a political non-starter. Given prevailing
cultural sentimentality about marriage, there is little to suggest any public
appetite to abolish it. A bill making a proposal to abolish marriage was
recently introduced in Maryland, 96 for example, but there are no signs of
any momentum or movement in that direction, nor am I aware of any evi-
dence that it was ever considered seriously by the LGBT movement. One
wonders whether support might have grown-slowly, over time-for a
proposal of this sort. It could have defused the contentious debate over
same-sex marriage, while providing equal treatment by the state to all cou-
ples. It would have respected religious autonomy, with those religious enti-
ties fervently attached to the traditional definition of marriage free to
follow it by excluding same-sex couples, and other, more progressive reli-
gious institutions able to embrace and bless same-sex marriages, as many
now do. And it might have encouraged the development of more function-
ally-responsive family law by challenging the singularity of marriage qua
marriage. Still, it is possible that anti-gay forces would have responded by
excoriating the LGBT movement for "killing" civil marriage. As things
now stand, in any event, it represents only another path in the road that the
LGBT movement might have taken, but did not.
B. Looking Forward
Having looked to the past, let us now look to the present and future. Is
the internal critique of marriage a historic relic only? Or are there contem-
porary implications? I would like to suggest that there are, in fact, such
implications, and that empirical research can play a key role in bringing
those implications into focus.
In considering potential issues of contemporary relevance, let us re-
turn to the foundational Stoddard-Ettelbrick debate. Recall that this debate
took place twenty years ago, in 1989. The landscape has changed dramati-
cally since then. Reciprocal beneficiaries have been legally protected in
Hawaii for ten years. Civil unions have been available in Vermont for nine
years, and in other states for several years. Marriage has been legal in Mas-
sachusetts for five years, was legal in California for several months in
95. See generally Kramer, supra note 74; Polikoff, supra note 75.
96. Lisa Rein, Bill Would End Civil Marriage, Create Domestic Partnerships, WASH. POST, Feb.
5, 2008, at B4.
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2008, is now legal in Connecticut and Iowa, and will soon be legal in Ver-
mont. Same-sex marriage is also legal in seven other countries, 97 while
some form of partnership recognition is available in approximately twenty
others.98
These developments open up new and intriguing research possibilities.
Whereas the questions debated by Stoddard and Ettelbrick were largely
abstract and hypothetical, we now have some empirical evidence on which
to draw in examining the claims that animated their exchange. 99 There are,
in fact, a host of questions that might shed light on the internal critique of
marriage and suggest directions for future political advocacy. Let me sug-
gest a few such questions.
First, consider the debate between feminist skeptics and feminist sup-
porters of marriage about whether opening marriage to same-sex couples
would change the institution and its gender dynamics. Interviews with
same-sex couples married in the American states that allow it, or in other
countries, would provide a basis for going beyond generalized and theoreti-
cal claims, and for beginning to assess the ways in which these couples are
structuring their marital relationships.
Indeed, Vicki Schultz and Michael Yarbrough have undertaken some
research along precisely these lines. 100 They note that past empirical stud-
ies of same-sex couples have shown them to be more egalitarian than their
heterosexual counterparts in the division of labor within their relation-
ships.101 As well, Schultz and Yarbrough note research showing that het-
erosexual married couples have been traditionally less egalitarian in this
respect than heterosexual cohabiters. 102 They explore various theoretical
approaches that might explain what about marriage (versus cohabitation)
seems to encourage an unequal allocation of household labor.' 03 Work like
theirs offers a framework for thinking about same-sex marriage, gender
97. The countries are Nepal, Norway, Canada, Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands, and South Africa.
See Achal Narayanan, Nepal's Supreme Court OKs Same-Sex Marriage, PEw FORUM ON RELIGION &
PUBLIC LIFE, Nov. 21, 2008, http://pewforum.org/news/display.php?NewsID= 17001.
98. Meraiah Foley, Australian Legislators Back Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2008, http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/world/asia/26australia.html.
99. Ettelbrick herself recognized this in criticizing as unduly narrow a decision by the University
of Vermont to withhold domestic partnership benefits from any couple that did not enter a civil union,
once such marriage-like unions had been authorized in that state. Ettelbrick, One Size, supra note 43, at
913-14 ("No longer is my decade-old concern on this point purely theoretical!").
100. Powerpoint Presentation, Vicki Schultz & Michael Yarbrough, Will Marriage Make Gay and
Lesbian Couples Less Egalitarian? Assessing the Likely Impact of Marriage on the Division of House-





THE OTHER SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE
roles and how the social or legal dynamics of marriage might push same-
sex couples to a less egalitarian division of household labor. This would
seem a promising context for empirical research that tracks and follows
how same-sex couples who marry organize their relationships.
Second, how many same-sex couples who are legally able to marry
choose to do so? If significant numbers do not choose to marry, what ex-
planations do they give for their choice? Is there, in fact, a strain of anti-
assimilationism among same-sex couples? If so, is there any generational
effect? Where same-sex marriage is available, moreover, how do the statis-
tics about its usage break down in terms of race, class, or other demo-
graphic factors? Have arguments that same-sex marriage would
disproportionately be used by more socially advantaged couples proven to
be correct?
Surveys and interviews should help to elucidate which couples choose
to marry, and why. This inquiry, moreover, would have another layer in the
case of couples who have the choice to marry or to enter a civil un-
ion/domestic partnership. For example, some 109,000 same-sex couples are
thought to live in California (based on census data), 104 yet estimates are
that a far smaller number--i 8,000--married when they could do so. 105 What
can we learn about the many couples who did not marry? What drove their
choice? Some may not have wanted to formalize their commitment at all.
Others may have affirmatively preferred domestic partnership to marriage.
Still others may not have wanted to marry with the looming threat of
Proposition 8 hanging over their heads, given its potential to either reverse
pre-Proposition 8 marriages retroactively or to create subcategories of
same-sex couples, with some married and others barred from doing so. If
research along these lines were to show a substantial percentage of same-
sex couples simply eschewing marriage, it would suggest that there is more
internal resistance in the LGBT community than is readily apparent.
Moreover, if research suggests that a substantial percentage of same-
sex couples would prefer a civil union or domestic partnership to marriage,
that finding would suggest the virtue of preserving non-marital options,
even where marriage is made available to same-sex couples. 106 Notably,
the preservation of a diverse set of affiliative options does not appear to be
104. Jesse McKinley, Gay Couples Rush to the Altar in California Ahead of November Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at A 17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/08/us/08gay.html.
105. Bob Egelko, Legal Challenges: Same-Sex Marriage Issue Back in High Court, S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 6, 2008, at A19, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2008/11/05/
BA3B 13UM63.DTL.
106. On the issue of preserving alternative sources of protection, see POLIKOFF, supra note 13, at
108; Ettelbrick, One Size, supra note 43, at 912; Polikoff, supra note 75, at 175-76.
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consistent with the current political trajectory. The legalization of marriage
in both Connecticut and Vermont, for example, has brought with it the
legislative elimination of civil unions. 10 7 Such a standardization of the pro-
tection of same-sex relationships belies the claims of many equality advo-
cates that marriage should be only one "choice," but it has, thus far,
proceeded without much notice or protest. This development poses norma-
tive questions that give stark contemporary relevance to the internal cri-
tique of marriage.
Finally, there are a host of questions about marriage alternatives that
would provide insights into how they are functioning. For example, recip-
rocal beneficiary status is a particularly expansive and flexible form of
protection. Who is using it where it is available, and to what extent has it
helped meet a range of social needs? Research on this point would provide
some empirical insight into the functional critique made by Ettelbrick, and
developed at length by Polikoff and others. It would, as well, suggest direc-
tions for future policymaking. Studying domestic partnerships and civil
unions could also prove fruitful. For example, to what extent, and in what
particular respects, do same-sex couples in civil unions in New Jersey
(where marriage remains unavailable) regard themselves as stigmatized by
their inability to marry?
In sum, gathering data about those who inhabit the emerging social
category of same-sex couple can generate insights about the various legal
categories that are, at least in theory, available to protect and recognize
such couples, and can provide guidance about differences between and
among these legal categories.
CONCLUSION
The "other" same-sex marriage debate has been obscured by the in-
tense, publicly visible debate between proponents and opponents of same-
sex marriage. It is worth remembering the internal critique of same-sex
marriage because it was once a vibrant part of the gay-rights movement;
because it throws into relief the strategic and political judgments that have
led the LGBT movement to where it is today; and because it offers a basis
for critically examining same-sex marriage, civil unions, domestic partner-
ships, reciprocal beneficiary arrangements, and other emerging legal forms.
Looking back, then, may suggest how to look forward.
107. Joanna L. Grossman, The Vermont Legislature, Inventor of the "Civil Union, " Grants Full
Marriage Rights to Same-sex Couples: Why It Decided Civil Unions Were Not Sufficient to Ensure
Equality, FINDLAw, April 13, 2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20090413.html; Gay
Marriage Bill, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 24, 2009, at A 10.
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